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Constitutional law in our country has been almost entirelya domestic matter. This is hardly surprising, becauseone of the primary features of a constitution is to reg-
ulate relations between the government and the persons
subject to it, and relations among the elements of government.
Moreover, as we are seeing today, our government takes the
position—without expressly saying it—that international
norms that might inject a foreign element into any of those
relationships do not apply to us, except in the loosest sense.
This attitude does not hold true elsewhere in the world. The
post-WWII era can be characterized as the age of the judges.
Before World War II, there were almost no constitutional tri-
bunals in which judges asserted the right to annul legisla-
tion—in Western Europe, only Austria and Czechoslovakia did
so, and they did infrequently. (There were also a few relatively
insignificant courts in Latin America following the US model.)
Since 1945, however, when the Austrian court was revived,
almost every new state has established some kind of constitu-
tional court, usually in a separate tri-
bunal whose membership and
other characteristics are very dif-
ferent from the ordinary judiciary.
Although all of these courts were
obviously domestic tribunals estab-
lished by national constitutions,
they quickly became subject to
extra-national norms, primarily
regional norms, so that their con-
stitutional laws became, perforce,
internationalized.
In part, this internationalization
occurred because in almost all
cases a major element of the jurisdiction of these courts and
indeed a major reason for their coming into existence was to
protect and promote human rights, which in most parts of the
world are now subject to norms that are partly internation-
ally established and to some degree simply adhered to by many
different states. In many cases—and this applies not only to
human rights—these domestic tribunals have become subject
to regional treaties, regional tribunals, and other institutions
implementing those treaties.
Perhaps the most prominent examples come from
Europe—the establishment of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) to enforce the European Convention on
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to
enforce the Treaty of Rome, establishing what is now the
European Union. Among the ECJ’s many achievements, it has
also developed a substantial body of human rights law. The
ECHR, now in existence since 1959, has had an immense
influence both directly on the 43 countries subject to its juris-
diction and on tribunals elsewhere, which have been influ-
enced by its decisions.
The direct influence operates in two ways, both of which
force a state to comply with a supra-national constitutional
norm: in most of the states subject to it, the European Con-
vention is either incorporated by statute or by direct inclusion
in domestic constitutions. In the Czech and Slovak Republics,
all human rights treaties ratified by those two states are
expressly adopted as part of their constitutions and supersede
domestic law, with a proviso in the Slovak Constitution that
the superseded domestic norm not be higher. Romania also
allows international human rights treaties that it has ratified
to supersede inconsistent domestic law. The South African
Constitution provides that in interpreting its Bill of Rights,
a court must consider international law and may consider
foreign law. Even Great Britain, one of the most stubborn
holdouts, has gone most of the way to incorporating the
European Convention into domestic law, while superficially
maintaining domestic parliamentary sovereignty. 
Judges and lawyers in these 43 countries must therefore
look to a law that is common to all 43 outside of their own con-
stitutions. This is the theory at any rate, though in practice
things do not occur so smoothly. In many European countries,
and certainly in Central and Eastern Europe, looking to an
international convention or even a domestic constitution
for the governing norm is still quite alien to most judges
and lawyers. 
Even those Council of Europe (COE) members that have
not incorporated the European Convention into their domes-
tic laws must comply with ECHR
rulings on the validity of their laws
under the Convention, either by
changing legislation, as Britain had
to do until it incorporated the Con-
vention into its domestic law in
1998, or by otherwise remedying
the situation. The ECHR is not the
only regional court with this author-
ity. The other significant tribunal
is the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, which arguably has
had a similar but lesser impact, in
part because of the involvement of
less democratic and highly unstable regimes in Latin America.
An even more profound penetration of regional interna-
tional law outside the human rights area has resulted from
the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Union, for this
treaty addresses a vast number of private economic activities
in the EU states, as well as human rights. Here, even Great
Britain formally incorporated the treaty into its domestic
law. Under it, in the EU countries, domestic courts are bound
by the treaty provisions and must apply them, as interpreted
by the ECJ, including the implementing directives, often
overriding inconsistent local law, though here too, there are
some ambiguities related to human rights.
The European Court of Human Rights has had a signifi-
cant influence even beyond its jurisdiction. That influence is
the product of a much larger phenomenon—constitutional
courts looking for guidance from the decisions in other
countries dealing with similar issues. For  example, this search
for guidance elsewhere took place in one of the earliest of the
South African Constitutional Court cases—the1995 decision
in State v. Makwanyane, under the transitional constitution that
struck down capital punishment.
In his opinion, Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson wrote:
In the course of the arguments addressed to us, we
were referred to books and articles on the death sen-
tence, and to judgments dealing with challenges
made to capital punishment in the courts of other
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countries and in international tribunals. The inter-
national and foreign authorities are of value because they
analyse arguments for and against the death sentence and
show how courts of other jurisdictions have dealt with this
vexed issue. For that reason alone they require our atten-
tion (emphasis added). They may also have to be con-
sidered because of their relevance to section 35(1)
of the Constitution, which states:
In interpreting the provisions of this
Chapter a court of law shall promote
the values which underlie an open and
democratic society based on freedom
and equality and shall, where applicable,
have regard to public international law
applicable to the protection of the right
entrenched in this Chapter, and may
have regard to comparable foreign case
law.
Customary international law and the ratification
and accession to international agreements is dealt
with in section 231 of the Constitution which sets the
requirements for such law to be binding within
South Africa. In the context of section 35(1), pub-
lic international law would include non-binding as
well as binding law. They may both be used under
the section as tools of interpretation. International
agreements and customary international law accord-
ingly provide a framework within which Chapter 3
can be evaluated and understood, and for that pur-
pose decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable
instruments, such as the United Nations Committee
on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, the European Commission on
Human Rights, and the European Court of Human
Rights, and in appropriate cases, reports of spe-
cialised agencies such as the International Labour
Organisation may provide guidance as to the correct
interpretation of particular provisions of Chapter 3. 
Indeed, the first section of the decision after the statement
of the contentions of the parties was on international and for-
eign comparative law.
In its decision, the South African Constitutional Court cited
and discussed decisions from more than ten countries, rang-
ing from Tanzania to the United States to India, including a
decision from Hungary on the meaning of a provision com-
mon to the South African, Hungarian and German consti-
tutions requiring that restrictions not infringe on the essence
of a right. The Court cited some 100 decisions from these for-
eign jurisdictions, and discussed many of these.
South Africa offers another example of internationaliza-
tion, this time from an even more supranational source, but
with less binding authority. In the summer of 2002, the Con-
stitutional Court decided a very important case dealing with
AIDS and the right to health, Minister of Health v. Treatment
Action Campaign. In connection with this case, the Constitu-
tional Court looked to a detailed comment by the UN Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which imple-
ments the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) interpreting the requirements of the
relevant CESCR provision. Although the South African Con-
stitutional Court did not adopt all of the comment, its deci-
sion was clearly influenced by it.
International humanitarian law has also played a role. A
case from Hungary, Decision 23/1990 (Oct. 31, 1990), illus-
trates a rather special example, based on specific Hungarian
law. In the early years after the Velvet Revolution, statutes were
enacted to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes associated with
the brutal repression of the 1956 revolution. Most of these laws
were barred by statutes of limitations, and were struck down
by the Hungarian Constitutional Court—at the time, one of
the most creative and progressive constitutional courts in
the world. Some statutes survived, however: those that tracked
international war crimes or crimes against humanity and
were therefore not subject to statutes of limitation under
applicable international law. 
One final example of particular interest: the European
Social Charter is implemented largely through reporting
requirements imposed on the parties to the Charter. There
is, however, an additional protocol allowing for what is called
a collective complaint, whereby states party to it—of which
there are nine—agree to be bound by the decisions of the
Committee of European Social Rights regarding complaints
brought by non-governmental organizations “of unsatisfactory
application of the Charter.” Decisions against child labor
and forced labor have been issued. 
All of these developments led Lazslo Solyom, former Pres-
ident of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and one of the
most creative judges of our time, to rhapsodize about the
development of a world constitutional law. As in so many other
respects, the world minus one— the United States.
Recall the South African Constitutional Court’s looking to
over 10 countries for guidance on capital punishment, and
its citation of over 100 foreign cases. In our Supreme Court,
that kind of approach draws nothing but scorn and irritation
from some of the justices. 
In 1999, two prisoners on death row petitioned the
Supreme Court for writs of certiorari in the case of Knight v.
Florida, urging that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the
execution of prisoners who had spent some 20 or more years
on death row. One of them had spent almost 25 years await-
ing execution. The Court routinely denied certiorari, but Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer dissented, arguing that the Court should
consider the question. In the course of his opinion, Justice
Breyer wrote:
A growing number of courts outside the United States
—courts that accept or assume the lawfulness of the death
penalty—have held that lengthy delay in administer-
ing the lawful (sic) death penalty renders ultimate exe-
cution inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel
(emphasis in original).
He went on to cite and quote cases from Great Britain,
India, Zimbabwe, Canada, and the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee, the latter two upholding lengthy sentences but with
concern. Justice Breyer’s effort aroused the ire of Justice
Clarence Thomas, who wrote a concurrence to the denial of
certiorari, using the opinion as an opportunity to condemn
“this Court’s Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence.”
This term, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court ruled 6–3 that
mentally retarded defendants could not be executed. In
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tion the Government for a redress of grievances.” The United
States Supreme Court’s decisions are a product of their time
and context; the First Amendment has been restricted to
protect racial minorities but expanded to ensure the pro-
tection of the free market of ideas. Restricting hate speech
may improve the quality of public debate, mainly in the con-
text of most of the European states, and the U.S. model may
not be adaptable to young or weak democracies.
The Inter-American Commission and Court have not yet
dealt with hate speech issues, but the European Court’s inter-
pretation of Article 10 of the ECHR and the United Nations
Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
are immediate precedents for the American Convention,
seem to imply that Article 13 is incompatible with speech incit-
ing racial or religious hatred. 
Conclusion 
Freedom of expression is a right considered essential in
the promotion and respect of a democratic society, and
therefore must be interpreted in the least restrictive possible
way. This right has been privileged by both the European and
the inter-American systems, although a balance between this
right and other interests is sought through case law, recog-
nizing that there is a certain interdependence among the
different rights recognized in the Conventions.
The text of the European Convention is not as detailed in
describing the limitations as the American Convention, and
the European states have traditionally been granted a margin
of appreciation due to the political homogeneity that exists in
Europe and the confidence in the states’ abilities to redress
major violations. Nevertheless, the European Court has settled
vast case law narrowing the limits and defining the restrictions,
which the new democracies now incorporated into the system
will have to apply and respect. The Inter-American Commis-
sion and Court, more reluctant to leave to the states the
choice of abusing the limitations, have stressed the necessity
of respecting freedom of expression in the Americas, and in
1997, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression was created. 
True freedom of speech can be realized only if states fully
comply with the existing regional norms. Although this ideal
is still far from being achieved, awareness and promotion of
free and open debate is the first step to its realization. 
*Amaya Úbeda de Torres is a Ph.D. candidate at the Universi-
dad Complutense of Madrid, Spain and the Université Robert Schu-
man of Strasbourg, France. She is a visiting scholar at the Washington
College of Law and a visiting contributor to the Human Rights Brief. 
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describing the growing consensus against executing men-
tally retarded offenders, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
dropped a footnote in which he referred in passing to the fact
that “within the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.” This led Chief
Justice William Rehnquist to write a separate dissenting opin-
ion—Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the main dissent—to chide
the Court for its decision to “place weight on foreign laws,”
saying, “I fail to see, how the views of other countries regard-
ing the punishment of their citizens provide any support for
the Court’s ultimate determination.”
This October, Justice Breyer tried again. In Foster v. Florida,
petitioner Charles Foster had spent more than 27 years in
prison since his initial death sentence in 1975. Justice Breyer
urged the Court to take the case, again citing “courts of
other nations [that] had found that delays of 15 years or less
can render capital punishment degrading, shocking or cruel,”
and noting that The Federalist Number 63 also urged “atten-
tion to the judgment of other nations” when determining “the
justice and propriety of [America’s] measures.” This was just
too much for Justice Thomas, who again wrote a separate con-
currence to the denial of certiorari, bursting out in a footnote
that “while Congress as a legislature may wish to consider the
actions of any other nation on any issue it likes, this Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign
moods, fads or factions on Americans.”
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
were the only two who spoke out against the importation of
foreign norms even for consideration, I think they reflect a
very wide-spread attitude among American judges, as wit-
nessed by the absence of any substantial judicial use, for any
purpose, of foreign norms. Note also that Justice Breyer’s
efforts drew only marginal support from Justice Stevens in his
Atkins opinion. For this reason, I think any effort to import
international norms into American constitutional law, espe-
cially as governing norms, is largely a waste of time, at least
for some time. 
Constitutional law is indeed moving toward some degree
of internationalization . . . but not here. 
*Herman Schwartz is professor of law and co-director of the
Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at the Wash-
ington College of Law. He is the author of The Struggle for Con-
stitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2000) and
editor of The Rehnquist Court: Judicial Activism on the Right
(2002). Professor Schwartz presented this speech before the Ameri-
can Association of Law Schools, Section on International Law, on
January 5, 2003. 
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